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1. Introduction 
The global financial crises (2007-2009) referred to by the media as the credit crunch, is a 
major cause of the current recession that the world is faced with. In a time of recession we 
would expect the tourism industry to suffer significantly. When money is tight, business and 
leisure travel are dramatically reduced for all consumers due to company profits and 
individuals’ disposable income falling to considerably low levels. However, according to the 
United Nations World Tourism Organization the key trends in 2010 appear to contradict the 
traditional view that tourism falls during times of financial crises. This is due to the fact that 
international tourism arrivals increased by 6.6 percent from 2009-2010. In addition, tourism 
receipts reached US$ 919billion worldwide in 2010, up from US$ 851 billion in 2009.  
An additional aftermath of the financial crisis on tourism apart from the increase in tourism 
arrivals there was a change in travelling behaviour, perceptions and attitudes of the travellers 
with the need of different tourism products (Alegre and Pou, 2016;Bronner and Hoog,  
2016; De Vital and Kyaw,  2016). The direct response of the destinations was to develop the 
pertinent products in the ‘form’ of multifaceted activities with dynamic experiences as 
required by the various market segments (Lopes, Abrantes and Kastenholz, 2014).  
Given the contradiction between conventional financial theory and the evidence provided by 
the United Nations World Tourism Organization stated above and in more detail in Section 
2 of the manuscript, along with the lack of empirical literature in this very important issue, 
we feel that a comprehensive analysis of the tourism industry around the financial crises 
period is a vital piece of research that should be undertaken. We have attempted to bridge 
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this gap in the literature by examining the market liquidity effects of the Dow Jones Travel 
and Tourism Index before and after the financial crises.  
Our findings show a significant increase in the liquidity of the travel and tourism stocks after 
the financial crises. In addition, we show that the increase in liquidity is maintained over 
three-month post financial crises trading. Therefore, as the increase in liquidity spans over a 
three month period, we can say that there is a long-term improvement in the liquidity of the 
travel and tourism firms after the financial crises.  
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. The next section provides a 
review on the previous literature concerning travel and tourism during periods of financial 
turbulence. Section 3 describes the data and the methodology. Section 4 presents the 
analysis of both the short-term and long-term effects of trading before and after the financial 
crises for travel and tourism index stocks. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
   2. Literature Review 
2.1 Tourism in economic turbulence 
As a result of the global financial crises demand changed for various products and services 
in the Travel and Tourism industry (see among others, Papatheodou and Pappas, 2017, 
Smeral, 2010). The economic recession especially in the USA and Europe had a significant 
impact on the tourism industry consumption habits because of lower income and high rates 
of unemployment (De Vital and Kyaw, 2016). The immediate aftermath was that travelling 
habits became more short-haul, intra-regional and domestic (World Tourism Organization 
and International Labour Organization, 2013; Atul, 2008). The interrelation of economic 
down turn and the impact on tourism was the discussion in a vast number of research papers 
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(see among others, Alegre  and Pou, 2016; De Vita and Kyaw, 2016; Bronner and Hoog, 
2016; Alegre, Mateo, Pou, 2013;Culiuc, 2014; Papatheodorou, Rosselló, and Xiao, 2010; 
Ritchie, Molinar and Frechtling, 2010). The financial crisis creates opportunities for 
research especially on the behavior of consumers as a result of the new financial regulations 
that have been put in place (Sheldon,and Dwyer, 2010).  
Additionally, companies must readjust their strategies to accommodate both theirs and the 
consumers’ requirements according to the new economic situation (Brooner and Hoog, 2016). 
Bernini and Carbolic (2016) find that tourism as a consumption good varies in terms of the 
way it can be acquired and experienced. At the same time, tourism suppliers produce products 
that offer what is primarily needed by the various consumer groups (Liasidou, 2013). 
Undoubtedly, tourism is becoming an activity to the majority of the people in advanced 
economies basically because of the plethora of opportunities in the tourism marketplace.  
Nowadays, holidays can be easily booked online (Ukpadi and Karjaluoto, 2017) and at the 
same time there is a choice of various transportation modes with the most notable example to 
be the appearance of the Low Cost Carriers (Liasidou, 2017;Alderighi et al, 2012). 
Additionally, there is a variety of choices in the accommodation sector at any price range and 
service quality (Xiang et al, 2015).  
Historically, tourism was referred to the Grand Tour as the privilege of the members of 
aristocracy. The boom of the tourism industry happened after the end of the Second World 
War with the phenomenon of mass tourism. Thus, tourism became an activity affordable to 
most people in Europe and the USA. The emerging economies namely the BRICS (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa) contribute to the tourism industry both in supply and 
demand, with travelers to seek through tourism activities authenticity that create memorable 
experiences.  Dolnicar, Yanamandram, and Cliff (2012) discover that holidays are positively 
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associated with quality of life. Bernini and Carbolic (2016) find that tourism as a consumption 
good varies in terms of the way it can be acquired and experienced. At the same time, tourism 
suppliers produce products that offer what is primarily needed by the various consumer 
groups (Liasidou, 2013). The next part considers the methods of the study.  
3. Methods  
3.1 Data 
We analyze the 26 companies are listed on the Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index before 
and after the financial crises. The 26 companies in our data sample are shown in Table 1.  
We only analyze 26 companies because they are the largest travel and tourism companies in 
the world that dominate the industry, reflected by their inclusion in the Dow Jones Travel 
and Tourism Index. The financial crisis consists of 186 event days (30 percent of working 
days) between 1st January 2007 and 30th April 2009. Therefore in our event study the pre 
(post) financial crises date is before (after) the 1st January 2007 (30th April 2009). Our final 
dataset consists of companies that satisfied the following criteria:  
a) The company is not involved in a merger that immediately preceded its event date. 
b) The company has available historical data on the Dow Jones for a period of 90 days 
before and after the event date.  
c) The common stock of a company does not exhibit a split in the period of 90 days 
before and after the event date. 
Criteria (a)-(c) are applied to minimize the impact of alternative events that may occur 
during the same time period. Once the criteria are applied we yield a sample of all the 26 
companies.  For these companies, daily stock returns, daily trading volume and shares 
outstanding are obtained from the Dow Jones. Like previous market microstructure studies 
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(see among others Hegde and McDermott, 2003 and Gregoriou and Ioannidis, 2006) we 
obtain the number of analysts that follow the stocks from the Institutional Brokers’ 
Estimates System International (I/B/E/S) database. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
For robustness we implement two alternative measures of liquidity costs, the relative and 
effective bid-ask spread. The relative spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid price, 
divided by the midprice (the average of the bid and ask prices). As Lee and Ready (1991) 
point out the problem with the relative spread is that it can be regarded as an inaccurate 
measure of liquidity because many trades occur at prices within the bid and ask price. 
Therefore, in order to obtain a more accurate measure of the market liquidity, we follow the 
methodology in Heflin and Shaw (2000) and Hegde and McDermott (2003) and compute the 
effective bid-ask spread. The effective bid-ask spread is computed as twice the absolute 
value of the difference between the transaction price and the midprice in effect at the time of 
the trade. 
 
We begin our empirical estimates with the use of an event study surrounding the two event 
days concerning the pre and post financial crises trading of the 26 companies listed on the 
Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index. We define the event (i.e. day 0) as the 1st January 2007 
and the 30th April 2009 for the pre and post financial crises trading period.  We use the 
traditional market model which was first established by Brown and Warner (1985) and was 
subsequently used by most previous research on event studies (see among others Hegde and 
McDermott, 2003;Denis et al, 2003;and Gregoriou and Ioannidis, 2006).  
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The market model involves a procedure with a value-weighted market index and market 
model parameters estimated over the time period 90 days before and after the event date in 
order to calculate excess returns around the event dates for each security. The excess returns 
obtained from the market model are aggregated through event time to obtain cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR). We then aggregate the CARs across securities in order to compute 
the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR). 
One potential shortcoming of the market model is that the ACAR is computed assuming 
independent estimates for each firm. However, as Masse et al 2000, point out this method is 
problematic when the events are clustered, as they are in our study. The problem occurs 
because all 26 firms are exposed to the financial crises the same time period. This means 
that the abnormal returns calculated for each firm are unlikely to be independent. Instead 
there will be contemporaneous correlation of the returns across firms, resulting in t-statistics 
on average abnormal returns being biased away from zero (Brown and Warner, 1985). 
Beneish (1991) and Cable and Holland (2000) suggest that a solution to such a problem is to 
construct an equally-weighted portfolio of the 26 firms in our sample and to assess the 
average abnormal performance at the portfolio level.  
The portfolio does not suffer from contemporaneous correlation which implies that we can 
use the central limit theorem to derive its sampling distribution and obtain reliable t-statistics 
for our study (Campbell et al, 1997). We compute the ACARs’ at both the individual firm 
level and the portfolio level, the results are quantitatively similar, so we only report the 
individual firm results. 
4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Abnormal Returns of Tourism Industry after the Financial Crises 
Liquidity effects on travel and tourism stocks 
In order to investigate the impact of short-term effects of the financial crises on the Dow 
Jones Travel and Tourism Index firms, we compute abnormal returns and changes in 
liquidity around a five day event window, [-5, +5]. We utilize the standard event 
methodology outlined in the previous section of the paper for each stock in our sample for 
each event day. The results for the event window [-5, +5] are presented in Panel A of Table 
2.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
Panel A indicates that stock returns of the Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index firms are 
affected by the financial crises. Significant positive AARs (Average Abnormal Returns) 
persist over the 11 day event window, with the largest average return of 0.88 percent 
occurring on the first date after the financial crises (event day 1). The CAR from day -5 to 
+5 of 5.04 percent is distinguishable from zero with a t-statistic of 2.50. The short term 
abnormal returns results suggest that positive excess returns are gained by investors on the 
Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index due to the financial crises.  
If the financial crisis has improved the sustained liquidity of travel and tourism stocks then 
we would expect the abnormal returns witnessed in Panel A of Table 1 to persist over time. 
In order to test this hypothesis we compute the CAR of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism 
stocks over a three month event window [0, +90] after the financial crises period. The results 
are presented in Panel B of Table 2. We observe that there are significant CARs for up to 90 
trading days following the financial crises. Therefore, from the results in Table 2 we can 
report evidence of permanent stock price increases in Dow Jones Travel and Tourism stocks 
after the financial crises. 
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4.2 Trading Volume Effects of Financial Crises on the Tourism Industry  
To determine the possible presence of liquidity effects we proceed with the analysis of the 
impact of the financial crises on the trading volume of the Dow Jones Travel and Tourism 
Index. We test for the presence of abnormal trading volume in the event period by 
employing the following dummy variable panel fixed effects regression model.  
5
5
    for 1,26   and 90, 5jt j i i jVolume t D j tα γ β ε
+
−
= + + + = = − +∑    (1)  
Where jtVolume  is the logarithm of trading volume for stock j at day t. jα  captures the 
variation in trading volume across all the companies in our sample.  tγ  captures the changes 
in trading volume per day that is common across all the companies in our sample. iD  are 
dummy variables for each trading day in the event window [-5, +5]. The coefficients of the 
eleven dummy variables, iβ  capture the abnormal trading volume over the event window, [-
5, +5]. jε  is a random disturbance term with a mean of zero and a variance of 
2σ , ,jα  tγ  
and iβ  are parameters to be estimated. Equation (1) is estimated by a fixed effects panel 
estimator using the White (1980) heteroscedastic consistent covariance matrix. The results 
of equation (1) can be seen in Panel A of Table 3.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
The positive and significant sign of the eleven dummy variables confirms that there is a 
dramatic increase in trading volume in the tourism industry after the financial crises. For 
example, five days before the event ( i.e. event day -5) the coefficient on the dummy, 5β−  is 
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0.346 and significant with a t statistic of 2.93. The abnormal volume continues to increase 
and reaches its peak on the day of the event (i.e., event day 0). On this event day 0β  is 0.91 
and highly significant with a t statistic of 3.76, indicating that trading volume has 
substantially risen for the travel and tourism industry post the financial crises.  
Following the financial crises, the abnormal volume decreases from its peak but continues to 
be positive and significant throughout the post event period. The regression in equation (1) 
also passes the normality test, suggesting that the abnormal volume empirical estimates are 
not due to possible outliers in the data. In addition, jα is significant showing that there are 
changes in trading volume across the 26 Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index firms in our 
sample.  
In order to analyze changes in the long term trading volume of Dow Jones Travel and 
Tourism Index stocks preceding the financial crises, we construct a Post/Pre ratio of 
standardized trading volume in the post-crises period [0, +90] to the standardized volume in 
the pre-crises period [0, -90]. The results of the long term changes in trading volume are 
reported in Panel B of Table 3. We can see that the mean (median) Post/Pre ratio of 
standardized trading volume is`2.28 (2.21) with a corresponding t statistic of 4.63. This 
finding suggests that after the global financial crisis there has been a permanent rise in 
trading volume of the Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index. 
In the preceding section of the paper we attempt to explain the increase in the stock prices 
and the significant increase in aggregate trading volume of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism 
stocks, after the global financial crises, with the use of the information cost / liquidity 
hypothesis. 
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4.3 Information Cost Liquidity Hypothesis 
The information hypothesis was first established by Van Horne (1970) in the context of new 
listings on the NYSE, stating that listing signals good news about firms’ future prospects. 
Since the work by Von Horne (1970), researchers such as Schleifer (1986), Dhillon and 
Johnson (1991), Beneish and Gardner (1995), Hegde and McDermott (2003) and Gregoriou 
and Ioannidis (2006) have examined whether information about the investment appeal of a 
stock is provided by news of listing changes. They all report significant improvement in 
stock performance after inclusion in the index.  
From the previous section we discovered that there was an increase in trading volume when 
the 26 Dow Jones Travel and Tourism firms’ were traded post the financial crises. As a 
result of the increase in trading volume, Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index companies’ 
may receive more attention by analysts and investors’ resulting in lower bid-ask spreads and 
higher market liquidity. 
 
 If after the financial crises travel and tourism companies are followed by increased scrutiny 
by analysts and investors, the firms’ information environment is richer and the trading will 
be more frequent, resulting in increased liquidity. In this section of the paper we analyze 
whether there are changes in the information environments and the liquidity of the Dow 
Jones Travel and Tourism firms post the financial crises.  
If changes in the Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index before and after the financial crises, 
are associated with changes in the information environment, the stock prices of the Dow 
Jones Travel and Tourism Index firms adjust to reflect changes in future levels of available 
information.   
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In order to evaluate changes in the information environment of the Dow Jones Travel and 
Tourism Index stocks before and after the financial crises, we analyze the analysts’ coverage 
of the stocks in the pre-crises and post-crises period. To analyze the long-term changes in 
the information environment of the stocks following the financial crises, we construct a 
“Post/Pre ratio” of the number of analysts’ that follow each stock in the post-crises period 
[0, +90] to the number of analysts’ that follow the stock in the pre-crises period [0, -90]. The 
results of the analysts’ coverage of the stocks are portrayed in Table 4.  
 From Table 3 we can see that the mean (median) Post / Pre ratio for the analysts coverage 
of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index stocks is 2.65 (2.99). The change is highly 
significant with a t statistic of 3.70. The results suggest that there is a significantly richer 
information environment for Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index stocks once they are 
traded online.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
Given that Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index firms operate in a richer information 
environment after the financial crises, we proceed by analyzing whether the increased 
information environment of the stocks results in increased market liquidity in the manner 
predicted by Schleifer (1986), Dhillon and Johnson (1991), Beneish and Gardner (1995) and 
Gregoriou and Ioannidis (2006). 
In order to analyze the impact of the financial crises on the short term liquidity of Dow 
Jones Travel and Tourism Index stocks, we construct ratios of the daily average quoted, 
relative and effective bid-ask spreads over various time interval event windows in the pre 
and post financial crises period. The quoted bid-ask spread is constructed because this 
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measure of spread encapsulates the economic significance of the spread to the market-
maker, (Branch and Feed, 1977). The relative bid-ask spread is computed as the ask price 
minus the bid price divided by the mid-price. However, as pointed out by Lee and Ready 
(1991) the relative bid-ask spread has two potential shortcomings. First, it overstates the 
trading costs of a stock because it fails to account for the tendancy of prices to rise following 
a purchase and fall following a sale. Second, it can be argued that the relative bid-ask spread 
is an inappropriate measure of stock liquidity due to the fact that trades frequently occur 
within the ask and bid prices.  
In our dataset, for instance, approximately 30 percent of trades occur within the midprice. 
Therefore, in order to account for these two shortcomings we also compute the effective bid-
ask spread, defined at twice the absolute value of the difference between trade price and the 
prevailing midprice. There is however a potential problem with the use of either the relative 
or the effective bid-ask spread. The problem is that both measures of bid-ask spread will 
automatically increase, due to the increase in the midprice after the financial crises, 
witnessed in Table 1. Therefore, for completeness we also compute the quoted bid ask 
spread defined as the ask price minus the bid price, pre and post the financial crises trading 
period of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index Stocks.  
In order to provide a comparison of the liquidity of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index 
stocks pre and post the financial crises, we construct ratios of daily relative, effective and 
quoted bid-ask spreads over various event time intervals to their equivalents in the pre-crises 
period over trading days [0, -90]. The results of the changes in liquidity of Dow Jones 
Travel and Tourism Index Stocks pre and post financial crises trading can be seen in Table 
5. There is clear evidence from Table 4 that spreads are significantly reduced after the 
financial crises. For example, in the [-5, +5] event window the mean and median quoted bid-
ask spread ratios are 0.84 and highly significant. This indicates that spreads are significantly 
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reduced over the 11 trading day period centered on the first day post the financial crises. The 
results are robust across all liquidity measures. 
The significant spread reductions over the longer event time intervals such as, [0, +60] and 
[0, +90] indicate that the reduction in trading costs is permanent. This implies that the 
improvement in liquidity of the Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index Stocks as a result of 
the financial crises is permanent.  
[INSERT TABLE 5HERE] 
 
 
4.4 Multivariate Analysis of Long-Term Changes in Market Liquidity 
It is possible that the univariate analysis undertaken thus far in the study is based on factors 
unrelated to the impact of the financial crises to the Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index. 
To control for these external factors and improve the power of the econometric analysis, we 
perform multivariate analysis of the bid-ask spread. The multivariate analysis is undertaken 
in the form of a panel fixed effects estimator. Gregoriou et al, (2005) report that the bid-ask 
spread increases with return volatility and decreases with stock price and trading volume, in 
the London Stock Exchange. We estimate the following log-linear fixed effects model where 
the regression parameters represent elasticities:  
1 2 3 4 5( * ) Prjt j t jt jt t jt jt jtLiquidity D Volume Volume D ice StDevα β β β β β ε= + + + + + +  
for 1,2........,26  and 1,2.j t= =        (2) 
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Where t=1 corresponds to in the pre-crises trading of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index 
Stocks, [0, -90], and t=2 corresponds to the post-crises trading period, [0, +90]. The 
dependant variable, jtLiquidity  corresponds to either the quoted, relative or effective bid-ask 
spread for stock j at time period t. , Pr  and Volume ice StDev represent the traded volume in 
shares, closing price and return volatility for stock j at time period t. The dummy variable, 
tD  is equal to 1 in the post-crises time period and is equal to 0, otherwise. jα captures the 
time-invariant unobserved stock-specific fixed effects. The fixed-effect is accounting for 
differences in the initial level of liquidity of each security in our sample. We are mainly 
concerned with the change in the dummy variable, 1,β  and the change in the slope of trading 
volume as a result of trading post the financial crises, 3.β  All variables apart from the 
dummy, ,tD are expressed as natural logarithms. 
The fixed effects panel estimator, displayed in equation (2) can be estimated with the use of 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The problem of OLS is that it does not account for the 
presence of endogeneity trading volume, stock price and return volatility. In order to capture 
endogeneity and we use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) panel estimator. The 
GMM estimator established by Arellano and Bond (1991) uses internal instruments for each 
time period to deal with endogeneity.  
For equation (2) if ( ) 0it izE e e =  holds for z t≠  across all the securities then it represents the 
following moment conditions:  
( ), 0i t z itE y e− ∆ =  for 1;    1, 2.z t≥ =  
If the explanatory variables in equation (2) are weakly exogenous then we also have the 
following additional moment conditions: 
( ), 0i t z itE X e− ∆ =  for 1;    1, 2.z t≥ =  
Liquidity effects on travel and tourism stocks 
The single equation GMM panel estimator generally specifies a dynamic panel model in first 
differences and exploits the above moment conditions. Therefore, the lagged (one time 
period or more) levels of endogenous and weakly endogenous variables of the model 
become appropriate instruments for addressing endogeneity. The single GMM panel 
estimator provides consistent coefficient estimates. 
The panel estimation of equation (2) with the use of GMM is displayed in Table 6. The first 
thing to report is that the panel passes all the relevant diagnostic tests. The fixed effect of the 
panel is significant with a p-value of zero, suggesting that the differences in the initial levels 
of liquidity of the stocks in our sample are successful captured by the panel estimator. The 
test for first order residual serial correlation is insignificant, suggesting that the panel does 
not suffer from autocorrelation. The residuals of the panel are also normally distributed 
signalling that the results of the panel are not due to outliers in the data. Finally the results of 
the Sargan test confirm the validity of the instruments in the GMM model.  
The 2R  indicates that 67 percent of the variation in market liquidity is accounted for in the 
model. The variables Price, Volume and Stdev have the predicted signs and are highly 
significant. A more important result is that the parameter 1β  is statistically significant 
whereas, the parameter 3β  is insignificant. The significance of tD  shows that the effective 
bid-ask spread decreases on average by 10.15 percent in the post-crises period, after 
controlling for the impact of trading volume, share prices and volatility. Volatility has a 
positive and significant sign which agrees with the market microstructure literature. 
Essentially this implies that as market makers are faced with greater risk they increase their 
compensation for providing a financial market for the trade to occur. Also the coefficient 
estimates on the trading volume ( )jtVolume  is significant. This implies that a one percent 
increase in mean trading volume ( )jtVolume  is associated with a decrease of 8.12 percent in 
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the average effective bid-ask spread in the pre-crises period. The insignificance in the 
( )*jt tVolume D interaction term signals that this increase in trading volume is maintained in 
the post-crises period.  
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
From our findings we observe that after the financial crises, there was a significant 
permanent increase in the trading volume and the stock price liquidity of Dow Jones Travel 
and Tourism Index Stocks. This finding holds in both a univariate and multivariate 
framework even when the impact of share prices, trading volume and volatility of the stocks 
has been accounted for. 
 
The above analysis reveals that the financial crisis even the negative consequences that 
caused on the economic and social life, the tourism industry was not severely affected.  
Admittedly, households’ budgets were restrained however, there was not a restriction on 
tourism spending because people continue going for holidays (Alegre et al, 2013). The 
results provide a useful insight for the Governments, firms and employees that in case of an 
economic turbulence the tourism industry remains unaffected.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The financial crises in the banking sector between 2007-2009 has resulted in a global the 
financial crises on the travel and tourism industry, by examining the Dow Jones Travel and 
Tourism Index stocks before and after the financial crises.  
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Our empirical findings reveal that there is a long-term enhancement in liquidity of Dow 
Jones Travel and Tourism Index stocks, post financial crises trading that persists over a 
three-month trading interval. We also find permanent increases in the stock price and trading 
volume of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index stocks after the financial crises. 
Furthermore, we observe a significant increase in analyst coverage for Dow Jones Travel 
and Tourism Index shares after the financial crises. This result in significant decreases in 
bid-ask spreads in the post-crises period, after controlling for the impact of stock prices, 
trading volume and volatility of returns.  
 
 
 
Managerial implications  
The research results add on the existing tourism literature and can be useful to tourism 
practitioners and are extremely striking because they go against the principles of financial 
theory. In a period of financial crises, we would expect significant declines in travel and 
tourism. This is because the failure of business and less disposable income for individuals 
should result in dramatic decreases for both business and leisure travellers. In our opinion 
our results should change the perspective in which travel and tourism should be viewed. It is 
no longer a luxury item but more a necessity to stimulate business and happiness for firms 
and individuals respectively, in times of financial turmoil. Given the lack of literature 
analysing tourism during the financial crises, we believe the findings in our paper cannot be 
ignored.  
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In particular, destinations should prioritise tourism as a remedy in case of a financial crisis 
and to be the industry of focus for economic recovery. As mentioned above, people even in 
tight economic conditions are travelling with a plethora of choices suited to all budgets. The 
industry has undergone a metamorphosis over the last decades and offered a plethora of 
products and activities. Additionally, tourism is considered as a vital and an essential 
activity and this should be considered so as tourism destinations and suppliers to be 
proactive and response strategically with more products and services for the future (Alegre 
et al, 2016). Governments should frame contractive policies and strategies in order to ensure 
the economic viability of the tourism industry that impacts positively the social life. An 
important aspect is the focus on quality tourism products that provide constructive 
experiences (Lopes et al, 2014). Quality impacts positively customers’ satisfaction and 
become loyal to destinations and firms (Kim, 2017).  
 
Finally, the results of the study are insightful to the firms that investments in the tourism 
industry provide high returns because of current trends with an increased number of travellers. 
The permanent rise in liquidity of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index stocks could result in 
increase in firm value. This is because it may be less costly for them to borrow, issue capital 
or issue public equity after the increase in liquidity resulting from online trading. Extensions 
that focus on valuation of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index firms after the introduction of 
online trading are promising avenues for future research. Also we could compare the impact 
of the tourism industry pre and post Brexit.  
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 Table 1: List of the companies in our data sample  
Number Company Name 
1 Expedia 
2 Travelocity 
3 Price Line Group  
4 American Express Travel  
5 Carlson Wagonlit Travel 
6 HRG North America 
7 AAA Travel 
8 BCD Travel 
9 HRG North America 
10 Corporate Travel Management  
11 Travel and Transport  
12 Altour 
13 Direct Travel  
14 World Travel Incorporation  
15 Omega World Travel  
16 JTB Americas Group  
17 World Travel Holding  
18 ATG Travel  
19 Vision Travel Solutions  
20 Adelman Travel Group  
21 Travizon 
22 Worldview Travel  
23 cheapcarribbean.com 
24 Fox World Travel 
25 Shorts Travel Management  
26 Travel Planners International  
 
 Table 2.  Abnormal Returns around  Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index Financial Crises Trading. 
The sample consists of 26 Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index firms that were available to be traded before 
and after the financial crises. Average Abnormal returns (AAR) are computed using the market model and the 
standard event study methodology. The estimation window for computing the market model parameters is the 
event time interval [-90, 90]. AAR is tested for significance using a t-statistic. 
Panel A. Short Term Abnormal Returns  
Event Day AAR (%) T test H0: AAR=0 
-5 0.14 2.30** 
-4 0.31 2.25** 
-3 0.36 2.18** 
-2 0.62 2.65** 
-1 0.86 2.63** 
0 0.42 3.24** 
+1 0.88 3.01** 
+2 0.64 2.67** 
+3 0.39 2.20** 
+4 0.30 2.16** 
+5 0.12 2.09** 
[-5, +5] 5.04 2.50** 
  
Panel B. Long Term Abnormal Returns  
 
Event Day AAR (%) T test H0: AAR=0 
[0, +10] 
[0, +20]                                            
0.72 
0.65 
2.22** 
2.13** 
[0, +30] 0.55 2.21** 
[0, +60] 0.43 2.13** 
[0, +90] 0.31 2.16** 
 
** Significant at 5% level.  
 
 Table 3. Trading Volume around Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index Financial Crises Trading. 
Panel A. Short Term Abnormal Trading Volume. 
The following panel fixed effects regression model is estimated to investigate the changes in trading volume 
surrounding the dates of the financial crises on 26 firms listed on the Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index.  
5
5
    for 1, 26   and 90, 5jt j i i jVolume t D j tα γ β ε
+
−
= + + + = = − +∑       
Where jtVolume is the logarithm of trading volume for stock j at day t. jα  captures the variation in trading 
volume across all the companies in our sample.  tγ  captures the changes in trading volume per day that is 
common across all the companies in our sample. iD  are dummy variables for each trading day in the event 
window [-5, +5]. The coefficients of the eleven dummy variables, iβ  capture the abnormal trading volume over 
the event window, [-5, +5]. jε  is a random disturbance term with a mean of zero and a variance of 
2σ , ,jα  tγ  
and iβ  are parameters to be estimated. NORM (2) is the p-value for the Jarque-Bera normality test. 
Parameter Estimate T statistic 
jα  0.125 2.63** 
tγ  0.0034 2.23** 
5β−  0.346  
2.93** 
 
4β−  0.476 2.83**  
3β−  0.584                                                2.26** 
2β−  0.672 2.23** 
1β−  0.836 2.92** 
0β  0.91 3.76** 
1β+  0.84  
2.32** 
2β+  0.632 2.82** 
3β+  0.532 2.76** 
4β+  0.493 2.01** 
5β+  0.282 2.90** 
Adjusted R2 = 0.65     
NORM (2) = 0.47   
 
 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
 
 Panel B. Long Term Trading Impact of Trading Volume on Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index Financial 
Crises Trading 
The sample consists of 26 Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index firms that were traded before and after the 
financial crises. Standardized trading volume is defined as daily trading volume in shares divided by the total 
Dow Jones trading for the same day. Standardized trading volumes are computed for the pre-financial crises 
period [0, -90] and the post financial crises period [0, +90]. The t statistic is constructed to test the null 
hypothesis that the standardized trading volume is unchanged in the pre-financial crises period as compared with 
the post-financial crises period. 
Variable Standardized Trading Volume 
Mean (Pre-internet) 0.00657% 
Mean (Post-internet) 0.0150% 
Median (Pre-internet) 0.00652% 
Median (Post-internet) 0.0144% 
Mean (Post/Pre Ratio) 2.28 
Median (Pre/Post Ratio) 2.21 
T Test 4.63** 
 
** Significant at 5% level. 
 
Table 4. Long Term impact on Analyst Coverage of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index Stocks Pre-Post 
Financial Crises Trading. 
The sample consists of 26 Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index firms that were traded before and after the 
financial crises. The number of analysts following the stock is the number of earning estimates as reported in the 
I/B/E/S summary data file. The number of analysts are computed for each stock for the pre financial crises 
period [0, -90] and the post financial crises period [0, +90]. The t statistic is constructed to test the null 
hypothesis that the number of analysts following each stock is unchanged in the pre-financial crises period as 
compared with the post-financial crises period. 
Variable Analyst Coverage 
Mean (Pre-internet) 1.2 
Mean (Post-internet) 3.2 
Median (Pre-internet) 1 
Median (Post-internet) 3 
Mean (Post/Pre Ratio) 2.65 
Median (Pre/Post Ratio) 2.99 
T Test 3.70** 
 
** Significant at 5% level. 
 
 
 
 
 Table 5 Short and Long Term Effects of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index Financial Crises Trading 
on Stock Market Liquidity 
Stock market liquidity is measured by the quoted, relative and effective bid-ask spreads of 26 Dow Jones Travel 
and Tourism Index firms after the financial crises. Quoted bid-ask spread is defined as the ask price minus the 
bid price. Relative bid-ask spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid price divided by the quoted midprice. 
Effective bid-ask spread is defined as is defined as twice the absolute value of the difference between the 
transaction price and the midprice in effect at the time of the trade. All spread ratios are computed as the ratio of 
the average bid-ask spread of each individual stock over the indicated event time period to the average bid-ask 
spread measure over the pre-financial crises trading period of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index Stocks, [0, -
90]. The null hypothesis that the mean of the reported ratio is equal to one is tested using a standard t statistic.  
Event Time 
Interval 
Quoted 
Spread 
(%), Mean 
(Median) 
Relative 
Spread 
(%), Mean 
(Median) 
Effective 
Spread 
(%), Mean 
(Median) 
[0, 0] 
T Test 
0.85 (0.86) 
-4.15** 
0.81 (0.80) 
-4.23** 
0.82 (0.81) 
-4.19** 
[-1, +1] 
T Test 
0.84 (0.84) 
-4.01** 
0.82 (0.81) 
-4.04** 
0.83 (0.82) 
-3.99** 
[-2, +2] 
T Test 
0.85 (0.86) 
-4.31** 
0.81 (0.80) 
-4.29** 
0.82 (0.81) 
-4.25** 
[-3, +3] 
T Test 
0.86 (0.86) 
-3.87** 
0.82 (0.81) 
-3.99** 
0.83 (0.82) 
-3.95** 
[-4, +4] 
T Test 
0.85 (0.86) 
-4.13** 
0.81 (0.81) 
-4.09** 
0.82 (0.82) 
-4.04** 
[-5, +5] 
T Test 
0.84 (0.84) 
-3.90** 
0.82 (0.81) 
-3.92** 
0.83 (0.83) 
-3.87** 
[0, +10] 
T Test 
0.88 (0.87) 
-3.84** 
0.84 (0.84) 
-3.82** 
0.85 (0.84) 
-3.80** 
[0, +30] 
T Test 
0.89 (0.88) 
-3.76** 
0.86 (0.85) 
-3.70** 
0.87 (0.88) 
-3.72** 
[0, +60] 
T Test 
0.93 (0.92) 
-2.31** 
0.90 (0.89) 
-2.22** 
0.91 (0.90) 
-2.24** 
[0, +90] 
T Test 
0.96 (0.95) 
-2.06** 
0.94 (0.93) 
-2.02** 
0.95 (0.94) 
-2.00** 
 
** Significant at 5% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 6. A multivariate analysis of the long-term impact on stock market liquidity.  
The sample consists of 26 Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index firms that were traded before and after the 
financial crises. A log-linear Panel regression model estimated with the use of Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM 
estimator is used. The Panel is used to determine whether the average market liquidity of the stocks improves 
following the financial crises after controlling for average stock price, trading volume and volatility of stock 
returns. In addition, 3β  tests if the slope coefficient on trading volume has changed following the financial 
crises. The Panel model has the following specification:  
1 2 3 4 5( * ) Prjt j t jt jt t jt jt jtLiquidity D Volume Volume D ice StDevα β β β β β ε= + + + + ++  
for 1, 2........, 26  and 1, 2.j t= =  
Where t=1 corresponds to in the pre-financial crises trading of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index Stocks, [0, 
-90], and t=2 corresponds to the post-financial crises trading period, [0, +90]. The dependant variable, 
jtLiquidity  corresponds to either the quoted, relative or effective bid ask spread for stock j at time period t. 
Quoted bid-ask spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid price. Relative bid-ask spread is defined as the 
ask price minus the bid price divided by the quoted midprice. Effective bid-ask spread is defined as is defined as 
twice the absolute value of the difference between the transaction price and the midprice in effect at the time of 
the trade. , Pr  and Volume ice StDev  represent the traded volume in shares, closing price and return volatility for 
stock j at time period t. The dummy variable, tD  is equal to 1 in the post-financial crises time period and is 
equal to 0, otherwise. All the variables apart from tD  are expressed as natural logarithms. jα captures the time-
invariant unobserved stock-specific fixed effects. AR(1) is the first order Lagrange Multiplier test performed on 
the first difference of the residuals because of the transformations involved. Sargan tests follow a 2χ distribution 
with r degress of freedom under the null hypothesis of valid instruments. NORM (2) is the p-value for the 
Jarque-Bera normality test. The endogenous explanatory variables (all variables apart from tD ) in the panel are 
GMM instrumented setting 1.z ≥ [.] are p values and (.) are t statistics.  
Variables Quoted Bid-Ask Spread Relative Bid-Ask  Spread Effective Bid-Ask Spread 
Constant -0.886 (-10.23)** -0.923 (-11.24)** -0.925 (-11.26)** 
D -9.15 (-11.52)** -9.63 (-12.98)** -10.15 (-13.63)** 
Volume -7.31 (-8.93)** -7.16 (-8.97)** -8.12 (-8.94)** 
(Volume*D) 0.024 (1.04)  0.025 (1.05) 0.026 (1.03) 
Price -2.361 (-70.21)** -2.357 (-70.23)** -2.350 (-70.33)** 
StDev 0.782 (17.23)** 0.791 (18.21)** 0.790 (18.26)** 
iα  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
R2 0.571 0.574 0.670 
NORM (2) [0.231] [0.234] [0.237] 
AR(1) [0.421] [0.424] [0.427] 
Sargan 2 ( )rχ  [0.458]  [0.510]  [0.513] 
 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
